Studies explaining the timeliness and correctness of the transposition of EU directives into national legislation have provided rather inconclusive findings. Therefore, they do not offer a clear-cut prediction concerning the transposition of the patients' rights directive, which is one of the first that concerns the organisation and financing of national healthcare systems. This paper applies the perspective of bounded rationality to explain (irregularities in) the timely and correct transposition of EU directives.
bounded rationality is apparent in the transposition processes in these relatively well-organised countries, future transposition studies should devote greater consideration to the bounded rationality perspective.
Introduction
Many policy sectors in the member states of the European Union (EU) have been confronted with the transposition of EU directives into national legislation. The healthcare sector is a relative latecomer in this respect. Adopted in 2011, Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare (hereafter, the patients' rights directive) is one of the first concerning the organisation, financing and provision of diagnosis, care and cure to ill persons (to be distinguished from public health, which refers to policy measures to increase the physical and mental well-being of all persons). Little is known about implementation of EU law in the healthcare sector (Lamping 2013) , but transposition studies of other policy sectors may indicate how it could unfold. The scholarly literature on the transposition of EU directives has grown substantially over the last two decades. A wide variety of factors have been indicated to explain the timeliness and correctness of transposition. However, the transposition literature does not provide unequivocal expectations for the timely and correct transposition of directives in a 'new' healthcare sector. Administrative capacity and domestic opposition seem to be influential factors, but transposition studies continue to struggle with "inconclusive", "contradictory", or "inconsistent" findings concerning the factors explaining timely and correct transposition (Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010; Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 2010; Treib 2008 ).
This inconclusiveness could result from the particular countries and policy sectors studied or the imprecise measurements used (Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 2010 ). Sensitivity to contextual specificities can provide firmer conclusions regarding timely and correct transposition (Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010) . This article therefore explores the transposition process of the patients' rights directive in detail to determine the specific factors in the underexplored healthcare sector. It also delves into this process for theoretical reasons. Implementation processes (including transposition) are often as messy and conflictive as other policy processes (Barrett 2004; Pülzl and Treib 2007) . As theories on bounded rationality have long noted, preferences, problems, solutions, and decision-making processes can be fairly unclear to the actors involved, due to their cognitive constraints such as limited attention and organisational complexities such as the fluidity of participants or disjoint policy-circuits (Simon 1985; Cohen et al. 1972) . This is of particular relevance in the complex decision-making machinery of the EU (Jones 2001: 196; Nowak 2010; Olsen 2001; Richardson 2005; Zahariadis 2007: 86) and even more so when a distracting economic crisis with ensuing budget cuts is taking place. The inconclusiveness in transposition studies could thus arise from the actors' varying cognitive and organisational possibilities to understand a directive and its (mis)fit with national legislation, develop clear preferences, or adopt proper strategies in a timely manner to support or oppose its transposition. The research question in this paper is therefore whether bounded rationality, in part, explains whether and how directives are timely and correctly transposed and how this is related to the commonly employed explanatory factors of administrative capacity, misfit and veto player preferences.
The only way to determine whether, when and how cognitive and organisational constraints interact with other potential explanatory factors and relate to the timeliness and correctness of transposition is to examine the transposition process as it unfolds. Process-tracing during the transposition of the patients' rights directive has been employed to avoid post-hoc rationalisations of strategies by the actors involved. Two cases of well-administered countries, Denmark and The Netherlands, are selected to examine whether bounded rationality is apparent even in these countries and thus may constitute a more general factor affecting transposition across member states. This article proceeds as follows. After an evaluation of the transposition literature and the potential contribution of the bounded rationality perspective in section 2, the case selection, methods and empirical sources are discussed in section 3. The latter section also presents the origins and contents of the patients' rights directive. Following reports on the Danish and Dutch cases in sections 4 and 5, respectively, the final section presents conclusions regarding whether bounded rationality affects the transposition process and its outcomes. If so, bounded rationality should be emphatically considered in future transposition research.
Explaining the timely and correct transposition of EU directives: a matter of bounded rationality?
Explaining the regularities and irregularities in the transposition of EU directives into the national legislation of EU member states has been an important subject in EU studies. Transposition studies reveal that the administrative capacities of member states and the heterogeneity of preferences among the relevant domestic actors seem to be the most influential factors explaining (un)timely and (in)correct transposition (for reviews of the transposition literature, see Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 2010; Treib 2008) . A lack of administrative capacities (financial, human and organisational resources such as staff expertise and coordination strength) could explain delayed and incorrect transposition (see also Vasev and Vrangbaek (2014) , this volume, for the importance of sector-specific resources). If their preferences differ, veto players, such as the ministries and sub-national authorities involved in transposition, can delay transposition using their blocking power. Misfit between EU legislation and domestic policy legacies has often been examined as explanatory factor but rarely seems significant. In general, transposition studies have remained inconclusive regarding the factors explaining transposition.
Given this inconclusiveness, transposition studies could benefit from theories on domestic policymaking, rather than EU-specific ones (Treib 2008: 19) . The bounded rationality perspective is well-situated in this respect. Due to its complexity, the EU is a "solid candidate" to qualify as a so-called organised anarchy (Zahariadis 2007: 86) . In an organised anarchy, preferences, problems, and decisionmaking processes are rather ambiguous and unclear among the manifold actors, whose involvement is often fluid (Cohen et al. 1972: 1) . In particular, in these complex contexts, rife with uncertainty, actors have limited opportunities to take well-informed, rational decisions, instead tending to act under 'bounded rationality' (Simon 1985) . Devoting attention to actors' cognitive constraints and the organisational complexities in which they operate might offer a better understanding of the inconsistencies in the explanations of transposition.
Rational choice theories suppose that actors have sufficient resources and information to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the transposition alternatives and their effects to adopt a strategy to maximise the net value of expected returns for themselves. They thus assume that the preferences of these actors are fixed, rank-ordered and unambiguous and decision-making procedures are clear.
However, organisation theory and behavioural decision theory have long highlighted the limitations of these rational choice assumptions as descriptive and predictive models of human behaviour (Jones 1999) . Actors rather act under bounded rationality, which is "…behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker" (Simon 1985: 294) . Bounded rationality does not assume that actors are irrational. Individuals generally have reasons for what they do (Simon 1985: 297) . However, due to the complexity of political life and actors' cognitive limitations, policy choices are not made according to rational procedures. Instead of surveying the overall situation and weighing different alternatives against one another, actors have limited attention spans. Actors behave according to habituation and routine, opting for a satisfactory, instead of the optimal, solution. When confronted with major policy changes, they tend to mobilise their serial processing capacity instead of acting in a utility-maximising manner (Jones 1999: 303) . A limited attention span implies that actors do not consider all implications of a decision but make what they can of the situation, thus only examining the most relevant aspects. As Simon noted, "[p] eople are, at best, rational in terms of what they are aware of, and they can be aware of only tiny, disjointed facets of reality" (Simon 1985: 302) . In other words, actors' information processing is often not optimal, and even if information is available, it is often ignored (Jones 1999: 310) .
Information could enhance rational decision-making. The more and the longer actors have been involved in policy processes, the better they may analyse policy alternatives and their consequences and act accordingly in a strategic manner. However, more and better information does not necessarily limit differences in views, perspectives and priorities among the actors involved (Zahariadis 2007: 66) .
Decision-making is not only a matter of uncertainty (actors lacking information) but also of ambiguity (actors' diverse understandings of information). Ambiguity complicates the rational pursuit of preferences by an organisation, as the ultimate goals are unclear to the actors involved (Jones 1999: 308) . Certain organisations are more prone to ambiguity and uncertainty than others. This notion is central to the garbage can theory developed by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) and the policy streams model advanced by Kingdon (1984) . Due to the complex and fragmented nature of an organisation, such as a national government or a university, actors are unable to complete grasp the decision-making process. Given the fluidity of participants and variety of disjoint policy-circuits in the decision-making process, attention can only be selective. This allows strategic actors (policy-entrepreneurs) to manipulate the content and timing of information to link a (self-perceived) problem to their favoured (pre-existing) solution. Policy choices thus rather emerge from the organised anarchy than result from a well-considered selection of alternatives for a given problem.
Studies of bounded rationality have largely focused on the choices made in the agenda-setting parts of policy processes. Nevertheless, there is no reason that this perspective may not be fruitfully applied to choices made in other parts of policy processes, such as implementation (Zahariadis 2007: 80, 86) . For a variety of reasons, the implementation of EU law would be a prime subject for the study of bounded rationality. First, shared preferences among the manifold actors in the complex, multi-level, sectorally divided EU is rather unlikely. EU legislation reflects the compromises of 28 member states, the European Commission and the European Parliament. As a consequence, it often contains fuzzy, ambiguous aims.
The discretion to select the means by which the policy goals established in EU directives are to be met increases uncertainty and ambiguity, particularly if the directives concerned do not neatly fit domestic policies. Indeed, new, complex directives offering substantial policy discretion are more likely to suffer from delayed and incorrect transposition (cf. Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009 ).
Furthermore, within the complex EU, actors at the national level may be unaware of evolutions at the EU level. The development of preferences among actors during the negotiation phase of EU directives could therefore coincide with a lack of preferences regarding (aspects of) the EU legislation among implementation actors. Additionally, the rationale behind the numerous compromises established during Council negotiations may be long forgotten when these compromises are to be implemented domestically. Further, even if manifold implementing actors are aware of the basic rationale, they could be overly absorbed by other domestic issues to thoroughly consider their preferences, problem analyses and strategies. Preferences and strategies would thus be rather developed during the implementation process, which would lead to actors retrospectively justify their policy choices. A change in participants and distractions from other policy issues, which are rather likely in massive organisational complexes such as the EU and the healthcare sector, could contribute to the confusion regarding strategies, preferences and problem analyses concerning the transposition of a directive.
The bounded rationality perspective could thus explain why the scholarly literature is inconclusive concerning the factors determining the timely and correct transposition of EU directives. First, veto player explanations assume actors to be rational. Such an assumption is debatable. Preferences might not be given and fixed, while cognitive and organisational constraints hamper actors' understandings of the problem (i.e., the directive to be transposed), the (mis)fit between the directive and national policies, the available decision-making strategies and possible solutions. Due to organisational and cognitive constraints, the transposition process could eventually result in a quasi-accidental connection of a problem and policy solution on the part of a policy-entrepreneur. Three explanatory factors commonly considered in transposition studies would thus be clearly affected by bounded rationality.
The following section explains how this paper will assess the impact of bounded rationality on the transposition process.
Studying a process as it unfolds
Qualitative case studies are best suited to examining how bounded rationality affect the transposition process as it unfolds (cf. Gerring 2007) . Therefore, the collection of legislative documentation, reports from the ministries on transposition, parliamentary debates, policy papers composed by the wide variety of health actors and interviews with key players and experts were completed during the transposition process to determine how preferences, strategies, and problem analyses evolved during the transposition period. The cases selected are Denmark and the Netherlands. If bounded rationality had an impact, even in these two relatively well-organised countries, future transposition studies should consider this factor more emphatically.
The phenomenon to be explained is the timeliness and correctness of the transposition of the patients' rights directive into national legislation. The directive will be considered timely and correctly transposed if no strong criticism is raised by well-informed and independent legal experts on the implementation of key articles. These key articles are presented in table 1 below. The directive has a long history, riddled with controversies. Based on Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems (and its predecessors since 1958), most EU citizens could only be granted the privilege of receiving reimbursement for planned healthcare obtained elsewhere in the EU. In a series of verdicts since 1998, the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) declared cross-border healthcare to be subject to the free movement of goods and services in all EU healthcare systems. In principle, EU citizens therefore have the right to access to cross-border healthcare and its reimbursement. However, the CJEU identified exemptions to free movement, such as a system of prior authorisation for hospital treatment, justifiable for reasons of financial sustainability for national healthcare systems or the maintenance of public 
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A member state providing treatment is obliged to ensure:
 national contact points providing information on (the supervision of) healthcare standards  healthcare providers provide information on treatment options, availability, quality and safety, and prices  transparent complaint procedures if patients suffer harm  access to the patient's medical record  non-discrimination in access and pricing The directive contains a high level of discretion, as numerous clauses state that Member states "may" engage in certain actions. For instance, member states "may" deliver information on cross-border healthcare in other than its official language(s) and "may" cover additional costs related to cross-border healthcare other than those indicated in the directive. The directive also contains several articles concerning voluntary cooperation on issues such as health technology assessment, e-health and the creation of reference networks of highly specialised healthcare providers. Voluntary cooperation is not examined here, as it does not have to be transposed into national legislation. Table 1 only presents articles that must be transposed.
The case studies examine the transposition processes to determine the impact of bounded rationality and three commonly employed explanatory factors: administrative capacities, the policy (mis)fit between the directive and national rules and the preference heterogeneity among veto players. Table 2 details the potential indicators of these three factors. It also indicates how the impact of bounded rationality could be identified. Whereas Denmark and the Netherlands are often considered to be member states with relatively strong administrative capacities, they differ on policy fit and veto actors. Denmark is expected to face greater difficulty in transposing the directive than the Netherlands. As will be explained in detail below, the Netherlands has had more experience with cross-border healthcare. It also implemented the relevant CJEU case law before the directive was proposed, while Denmark has been reluctant to do so. The Dutch system of regulatory competition among health providers and health insurance companies also seems to better fit the directive's emphasis on free choice than the public planning underlying the Danish national health service system. In addition, regions may act as veto players in the decentralised Danish healthcare system. On first sight, Denmark would thus face greater challenges in transposing the directive timely and correctly than the Netherlands.
Factor Potential indicators
The Danish transposition of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare
Danish healthcare is provided by means of a national health service (NHS) system, which offers healthcare as benefits-in-kind, tax-financed, largely free of charge and publicly supplied. The system can be characterised as a decentralised, public, integrated healthcare system in which the responsibility for organising and delivering services is placed in the hands of the five Danish regions (Martinsen and Vrangbaek 2008) . Primary care services are provided by private practitioners, i.e., general practitioners (GPs), but are publicly funded and firmly integrated into regional planning. General practitioners serve as important gatekeepers in the system, referring patients to specialised care and hospital care.
Treatment is largely provided free of charge, but co-payments exist, primarily for medicine, dentistry and physiotherapy.
Territoriality 
The process of transposition in Denmark
The Danish position on EU regulation of the healthcare sector has been rather reluctant. The Danish implementation of CJEU case law can be characterised as defensive and minimal, mirroring the country's highly sceptical position concerning the application of internal market principles in healthcare The new civil servant assigned the responsibility had no previous experience with the issue of cross-border healthcare and also was responsible for performing other departmental tasks. In reality, few and inconsistent resources were devoted to transposition, making the specific sectoral administrative capacity low. The initial phase was marked by a considerable loss of institutional memory.
In the initial phase of transposition, the Ministry organised a reference group in which the regions, relevant agencies and the municipalities represented by Local Government Denmark participated with the Ministry of Health. However, the regions and municipalities found that the reference group primarily served to allow the Ministry to present its considerations but did not grant them influence on transposition (Interview, November 2012). Moreover, the patient organisations felt that they were excluded, finding transposition to be a very closed process involving a few civil servants in the Ministry;
"It is like they fear losing their grip. Therefore it just becomes more meetings where we are briefed. It's one-way communication. (..) there is no invitation to establish a dialogue" (Interview, November 2012).
For the first two years, the Ministry of Health was largely the only actor involved. However, its preparatory work was marked by unsettled consideration in the hands of new civil servants who had inherited a dossier that they had not negotiated and for which they had no relevant experience. Rather than strategies and clear preferences, main actors were unsure of how to cope with 'very difficult rules' (Interview, August 2012). Furthermore, the aims, principles and the basic logic of this task were found to challenge the Danish healthcare legacy, 'forcing us to think along more market-based logics' (Interview, The regions expected that they would play an influential role in transposition but found themselves excluded (interviews, August 2012, November 2012, August 2013). As the governance level responsible for delivering healthcare and the practical application of the directive, there were numerous concerns and frustrations. The regions raised concerns regarding how to address patients' demands for cross-border healthcare, expecting them to only grow in the future. They thus expected the transposition process to also account for practical application, address alternative solutions and foresee their effects.
According to the regions, it was highly important that the functions and resources of the contact point would match citizens' demands. It did not find the Ministry's solution of relying on existing 'patient supervisors' in the regions to be adequate. Existing institutions were not considered sufficient solutions.
In addition, the regions found the fact that foreign patients could now access planned healthcare in Denmark a particular challenge. While the Ministry highlighted Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) prices as the natural level of price setting, again echoing existing solutions, the regions noted that the DRG is a rather abstract means of price setting, which fails to disaggregate the various components of a healthcare service or specify when a healthcare treatment begins and ends (interviews, August 2012, November 2012, August 2013). DRG prices might be effective in interactions between regions and national healthcare providers having learned to trust this price mechanism, but in an internal market, they hardly constitute transparent or full prices. Furthermore, as public hospitals had not been allowed to charge foreign patients for healthcare provided, there was no experience to draw upon. In summary, whereas the Ministry seemed to prefer to address contact points and price-setting through existing structures, i.e., 'business as usual', habituation and routine, the regions found this solution inadequate and considered it insufficient for practical application. The regions found that the Ministry did not sufficiently consider issues of practical application or the full effects of the directive;
"This is a big change. Potentially it can affect many. The whole system is in play. (...) This is not just a question of some patient supervisors having to do something more. It's a question of gearing the whole system. This is about all the doctors and nurses out there, who also have to be able to handle the situation when a foreign patient comes in. Advise and guide them. We need to set up a system that can issue invoices and send payment reminders. We are not exactly used to this" (Interview, August 2013).
The Complaints serving a coordinating function for the regional contact points. 6 Overall, the changes to national legislation are not assumed to result in additional costs for the Danish healthcare budget or its administration. 7 The regions consider this to be unrealistic and not in keeping with practical implications of the Directive, and hence they demand compensation from the state to fund and administer the additional costs that they foresee (Interview, August 2013; see also the hearings submitted by the regions).
On Limited Capacity, Habituation and Bounded Rationality
The Danish transposition of the patient rights directive was not timely. Furthermore, Denmark has made extensive use of the prior authorisation procedure in its transposition, which is not considered to be in compliance with the directive according to legal experts (DR news, 24 October 2013). Finally, transposition is regarded as inadequate with respect to practical application.
The Danish transposition did not reflect strong administrative capacity. On the contrary, the organisational and cognitive constraints within an administration with limited resources were apparent.
On the one hand, poor administrative capacity resulted in a limited attention span, in which little time was allocated to consider alternatives and their effects. Instead of considering a more complete set of alternatives, the administration's responses sought routine and habituation, opting to rely on preexisting national solutions. Other actors, including the regions, found it difficult to influence the process.
Instead of shared knowledge and dialogue, the process was found to be secluded, delayed and difficult to access. In such a situation, heterogeneity of preferences becomes rather irrelevant, as transposition is de facto in the hands of the ministerial actors alone. In a transposition process characterised by limited capacity, the actors opted for what was manageable within the limited set of options that the disturbing principles of the directive allowed. The Danish government could not turn back the clock and preserve the Danish GPs' role as gatekeepers, deny foreign patients access to Danish healthcare or refuse to reimburse residents for medicine purchased in another member state. However, it was able to focus on prior authorisation, and so it did. Here, the government maximised its attention and extended the use of authorisation beyond what is considered correct.
The transposition of the patients' rights directive in the Netherlands
The Dutch healthcare system comprises a public framework in which mostly private actors provide, 
The process of transposition in the Netherlands
The obligatory public health insurance scheme preceding the Zvw had a system of prior authorisation to obtain planned healthcare from (foreign) non-contracted providers. The AWBZ still operates such a system. Until the 1980s, cross-border care remained limited to occasional airlifts for heart surgery and an arrangement for clients from a relatively isolated border region who could more easily access Belgian hospital care. Growing awareness of a borderless Europe in the early 1990s led not only to greater territorial circumscription of AWBZ health consumption but also to studies and experiments regarding cross-border healthcare, particularly in the border province of Limburg (Vollaard 2004) . The CJEU verdicts on cross-border healthcare raised considerable concerns in the Dutch healthcare sector concerning the sustainability of its system of (selective) contracting and GP referral in the face of the free movement of goods and services (Vollaard 2004) . In its verdicts, also concerning Dutch cases, to the relief of the Dutch, the CJEU indicated that certain exemptions from free movement are justified.
Notwithstanding these concerns, free patient choice in Europe also received sympathy from certain parliamentarians and even ministers of health. Ministers also perceived cross-border healthcare as a useful safety valve for the waiting lists and did not expect cross-border patient mobility to grow rapidly based on the experiments and studies mentioned above (Vollaard 2004) . In response to CJEU case law, the Dutch government abolished the distinction between domestic and foreign non-contracted providers, allowed access to non-hospital care without prior authorisation, and replaced national with international medical standards to determine the medical necessity of receiving healthcare elsewhere. The implementing directive on the mutual recognition of prescriptions, published in December 2012, included specific rules on prescriptions to be incorporated in national legislation. One month too late, on November, 18th 2013, the Regulation Medicines Act was amended to this effect. 13 On December, 18th
2013, the Dutch government notified the European Commission of the transposition of both the patient's rights and the implementing directives. From the perspective of the ministry, the transposition process was thus largely completed on schedule. Nevertheless, the Dutch transposition was subject to intense criticism from the outset. According to an independent legal expert, the government had much more "homework" to do (Van de Gronden 2011) . First, the existing possibility to limit reimbursement of care received from non-contracted providers could discourage patients from using the generally noncontracted foreign providers, violating the principal of free access, particularly in extramural care. In addition, the choice between the directive and Social Security Coordination Regulation should be adopted in the Zvw. Furthermore, the incorporation of the right of cross-border healthcare and a system of prior authorisation into the Zvw would much more effectively guarantee patients' rights vis-à-vis health insurers (Interview, October 2013 Second Chamber, 2013 -2014 , 33.750, no.2, 37-38, State Budget (September, 17th 2013 .
In contrast to all expectations, the directive was not transposed entirely on schedule in the Netherlands.
The mutual recognition of prescriptions and the NCP tasks executed by the CVZ were not incorporated into national legislation before October, 25th 2013. More strikingly, the Dutch government attempted to make its health insurance legislation less in keeping with the directive. This demonstrates how a policy-entrepreneur can exploit a certain solution (the directive) to combat a different problem (cost containment) than planned (the codification of CJEU case law). More aspects of the Dutch transposition process reflected bounded rationality. The fluidity of personnel, the directive's limited priority and an unclear division of responsibilities led to delays in transposition. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Health considered various alternatives for establishing a NCP and selected the most rational option with respect to costs and benefits. Moreover, the change in personnel did not result in a loss of expertise.
Nevertheless, as the proposal to limit reimbursements for non-contracted healthcare indicates, accurate information does not entail compliance with EU law. The emerging Dutch reservations concerning EU interference and cross-border healthcare have resulted in a growing divergence between the directive's goals and the preferences of the Dutch government and parliament. It is thus the heterogeneity of preferences between the national and EU levels rather than confusion regarding the contents of directive that explains the potential reversion of the Dutch compliance with EU legislation on crossborder healthcare.
Conclusion
The decision-making process of the patients' rights directive was marked by controversy. Has its transposition simply been a continuation of the conflicts by other means? In the cases of both Denmark and the Netherlands, continuing reluctance regarding EU interference in the organisation and financing of national healthcare is clearly present. Nevertheless, the delayed and incorrect transposition of the patients' right directive is not simply a matter of antagonistic preferences. Moreover, it is also not possible that a simple misfit could explain the transposition processes in Denmark. Cognitive and organisational constraints such as the fluidity of participants, the loss of institutional memory, and a lack of priority certainly also had their effects, particularly in the Danish case. The scholarly literature has emphasised how organisational complexities such as the autonomy and multiplicity of actors and levels of government involved foster bounded rationality. The case studies above also emphasise the fragility of the limited number of staff members working on a certain decision. As the Danish case revealed, the dismissal and replacement of two experts reduced institutional expertise and memory. Transposition is likely highly conditional on the availability and consistency of expertise. This implies an organisational fragility, which may be a reason for the inconsistencies in the explanations of timely and correct transposition, as it requires not country-level or policy-specific but issue-specific knowledge on the part of the (few) civil servants involved.
The Dutch case also demonstrated how staff expertise is not necessarily lost after a change in personnel, as the predecessors and other experts remained available to the new staff. Cognitive and organisational constraints on (rational) decision-making may thus not be equally distributed across countries, policy sectors, or administrative units. Future research should therefore explore conditions under which EU legislation would be properly implemented from the perspective of bounded rationality. A lack of experience with transposition has already been identified as explanatory factor for delayed and incorrect transposition (Berglund et al. 2006; Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010) . Mismatches between EU directives and national policies have also been identified as explanation (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009) . A larger misfit suggests greater uncertainty and ambiguity regarding how the directive should be transposed. This seems all the more likely when member states have to transpose new, complex directives offering substantial policy discretion in a relatively short time (cf. Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009 ). The transposition process of new, complex directives are expected to entail greater uncertainty and ambiguity concerning how they should be transposed among the actors in the policy sectors involved, whereas the time allotted to consider alternatives and their effects is rather limited. As the cases studies revealed, a bounded rationality perspective can thus be a fertile addition to the existing, yet inconclusive, explanations for timely and correctly transposition given the complexities of the multi-level European Union.
